


## CHAPTER 2 TRAINING AND OPERATIONS

*The armed forces should be primarily trained and equipped for the possibility of conflict with a first-class power...*

—Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, *The Canadian Military: A Profile*

### SECTION 1 OPERATIONAL READINESS: THE REASON WE TRAIN


1. Canada's Army remains a key instrument of the Canadian government's domestic and international policy. The Army's role in national policy is defined in the departmental Defence Plan, which, in turn, is predicated on the direction articulated in the 1994 Defence White Paper. The Defence Plan directs the Army to meet numerous operational tasks that span the entire Spectrum of Conflict. These tasks include preparations for war—in the event that our sovereignty is threatened or when the Canadian government decides to participate with NATO or the United Nations in operations of war. However, most of the defence objective tasks involve operations other than war (OOTW) in support of Canada's interests and most often as part of a United Nations or NATO coalition. The following diagram depicts the Spectrum of Conflict in which Canada's Army operates and upon which direction in the Defence Plan is produced.



**Figure 2-1: The Spectrum of Conflict and the Continuum of Operations**

2. The Army must be prepared for all types of operations within the Spectrum of Conflict. While some types of operations may seem benign, most hold at least the potential for organized violence and require Canadian soldiers to apply lethal force to bring about conflict resolution. Therefore, while the Spectrum of Conflict may seem progressive, in fact, the potential for violence and the requirement for combat capabilities are real throughout the Spectrum. To enhance understanding of this potential, Canada's Army has adopted the model depicted in Figure 2-2, which illustrates the type of combat scenarios our soldiers may face. View 1

operations involve intense combat missions in situations of general war. View 2 involves a mix of combat and non-combat operations in conflict situations that differ from traditional inter-state warfare.



**Figure 2-2: The Operational Environment**

3. Canada's Army is frequently committed to View 2 operations, while it still has a standing requirement to be prepared for View 1 eventualities. The prospect of combat engagements is prevalent in both views. Furthermore, the effectiveness of forces engaged in View 2 missions often rests on their demonstrable ability to use combat power to achieve their goals, even if this combat capability is held as a deterrent. Therefore, a credible combat capability is essential in Army operations in both View 1 and View 2 missions.

4. If the Army lacks the capability to operate throughout the Spectrum of Conflict, it will not be able to satisfy the demands of national policy. Hence, the Army must be multi-purpose. Also, if Canadian soldiers are not trained and equipped to engage in combat, they will have limited operational utility. Such limited ability would create a liability for our allies, and Canadian prestige in coalition operations would suffer. Therefore, Canadian units must be combat capable. Consequently, the Army trains Canadian soldiers, leaders and units for View 1, multi-purpose, war-fighting skills, and adds to this training the theatre and mission-specific training (TMST—defined below) required for specific View 2 type operations.

5. The Canadian Forces is developing a four stage mobilization plan that puts into context routine View 2 operations and how the Armed Forces will transition to an expanded capability in the event of a View 1 general war. Planning for Mobilization Stage 1 (Force Generation) deals with our continued involvement of forces in View 2 operations. Stage 2 (Force Enhancement) planning covers the forecasted contingency of a brigade deployment to View 1 or 2 operations with limited sustainability and with up to sub-unit Reserve component augmentation. Mobilization Stage 3 (Force Expansion) and Stage 4 (National Mobilization) envision the commitment of forces beyond current capabilities and would see significant expansion of the Reserve component. Figure 2-3 depicts the stages of mobilization.

MOBILIZATION STAGE	OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT	SIZE OF FORCE
STAGE 1 (FORCE GENERATION)	VIEW 2	UNIT OR BATTLE GROUP
STAGE 2 (FORCE ENHANCEMENT)	VIEW 1 OR 2	BRIGADE (LIMITED SUSTAINMENT)
STAGE 3 (FORCE EXPANSION)	VIEW 1 OR 2	BRIGADE (SUSTAINED)
STAGE 4 (NATIONAL MOBILIZATION)	VIEW 1	BRIGADE AND ECHELONS ABOVE

Figure 2-3: Mobilization Stages

## SECTION 2 THE FORCE GENERATION CHALLENGE

6. The number and diversity of Land Force tasks assigned in the Defence Plan precludes the Army from undergoing force generation and force employment as one entity (e.g., as a formed “Canadian Division”). The requirement for Canadian units to be ready to conduct simultaneous operations, domestically and on both View 1 and View 2 missions, together with constraints upon resources, climate limitations and the demands for instructor augmentation, prevents all Army units from maintaining concurrently the same level of war-fighting skill and competencies. Therefore, the Army will designate only a portion of its field force to be ready for operational deployments and concentrate collective training resources in time and space to ensure that these units are indeed well-equipped, combat-capable and trained to a high readiness status (see Figure 2-7). The training of these units will be the main focus of the Army training systems. Other portions of the field force designated to be at lower states of readiness will support the training of high readiness forces and perform other tasks, such as augmentee support to the individual training system.

7. The designation of main effort and supporting effort formations and units necessitates a cyclical approach to Army training and force generation. The Army’s training systems are reliant upon the maintenance of this cycle. There are three distinct phases to the force generation cycle:

- a. **The Support/Reconstitution Phase.** A period in which units recuperate after operations. This phase is characterized by a relatively high personnel turnover due to postings, individual career training courses, individual and group taskings in support of other army training, low level collective training, recruit intake and the acquisition of new equipment. This phase will also include “down time” for improved quality of life. The last part of this phase will see units reconstituted in preparation for the training phase.

- b. **Training Phase.** A period in which a brigade or unit undergoes progressive training toward being declared combat capable and ready (less TMST) to deploy on operations. Training will be focused on war fighting competencies. Personnel stability will be ensured in units undergoing training in this phase. At the end of the Training Phase, the unit will be considered combat capable.
- c. **The Operations Phase.** The period of time that a brigade or unit is considered at a high readiness status and is ready to meet commitments assigned to it in the SORD or unforecasted operational commitments.<sup>1</sup> While a unit is considered combat capable when it starts the Operations Phase, it is not considered operationally ready until it has the requisite TMST. TMST is all the training that is directed toward specific mission requirements. This training includes material not covered in QS or BTS training, material regarding operations in specific environments, and material from QS and BTS training that needs to be re-iterated or refreshed under conditions relative to the mission (e.g., live firing of crew served weapons or manoeuvre in jungle, urban or mountainous environments).




Figure 2-4: Phases in the Force Generation Cycle

---

<sup>1</sup> The Army will train for war in battle groups and brigades constituted from units in the order of battle. Operational readiness, however, may be managed using smaller building blocks. Cohesive and well trained sub-units may form the primary building blocks for operational readiness and deployment on unforecasted contingencies. When this occurs, the management of the three-phase cycle must devolve to commanding officers. While the unit is not the optimum level to manage force generation cycles, it may become necessary to do so during periods of high operations tempo across the Army.

8. The allocation of training resources to a unit will be determined by the phase of the force generation cycle that unit is in. A unit in the Operations Phase will be assured relatively stable personnel manning and will receive all required continuation training and TMST resources. A unit in the Training Phase of the cycle will be the main effort of Army collective training resource allocation and will also have personnel stability throughout the training period. Units in the Support/Reconstitution Phase will suffer personnel turbulence and their supporting status will be reflected in the limited resources allocated to them for collective training; they will be granted only those resources needed to maintain lower-level collective skills (to be defined yearly within the SORD). The length of time formations and units spend in each phase will be determined by the chain of command and delineated in the SORD.

## **OPERATIONAL READINESS AND FORCE GENERATION**

9. Operational readiness is the ability to provide a timely and appropriate military response to any threat. Operational readiness comprises unit personnel strengths, the qualifications of unit personnel and their status in screening for deployment, unit equipment serviceability, and individual and collective training. While training is but one component of operational readiness, it is the most critical. Training is the mechanism that melds these various components together to create responsive forces. It synthesizes doctrine and standards, equipment and resources, soldiers and leaders into combat-capable units and formations. Training within the force generation cycle must be managed to define which units or formations will achieve higher states of operational readiness when needed.

10. The Army conducts four categories of training—individual, collective, continuation and TMST (all but the latter are defined in later chapters)—that, when combined, prepare forces for operations.

11. While operational readiness is a result of deliberate Army and CF planning, Army force generation and sustainment is founded upon the Army's individual and collective training systems. Individual, collective, continuation training and TMST are conducted systematically to produce ready forces and sustainment forces. It is, therefore, a cyclic systems approach that is the guarantor of operationally ready forces and their sustainability over time. Sustainment is particularly critical when transitioning to Mobilization Stages 2, 3 and 4. Anything less than a systems approach to operational readiness will eventually erode the Army's operational potential and jeopardize mobilization planning. Therefore, training for force generation and sustainment must be systematic and cyclical, as depicted in Figure 2-5.




Figure 2-5: Training in the Force Generation Cycle

12. The cycle comprises individual training, collective training in preparation for operations, TMST, and continuation training to preserve individual and team skills, in-theatre training during operations and low-level training during force reconstitution. In the cycle, new doctrine and equipment may be integrated into the force; lessons learned from operations will be incorporated into new standards and teaching; leaders and trainers are to be selected and trained; and the Army training systems as a whole will continue to evolve. These are complex undertakings that require a systems structure and the discipline to adhere to a systems approach.

13. Reserve Force units will not be subject to the same force generation cycle as the Regular Force. Reserve Force units will train uniformly to maintain an essential level of capability that will facilitate augmentation for Mobilization Stages 1 and 2 as required and to provide the basis for expansion if further mobilization is needed. Reserve training cycles are discussed in Chapter 6.

### SECTION 3 MEASURES OF OPERATIONAL READINESS

14. Operational readiness must be measurable. Personnel screening and equipment serviceability rates are good indicators. There must also be criteria for measuring training and the differences in training standards between various components of the Army. Hence, the training component of operational readiness will be measured by using levels of training and levels of capability (LOC), which are defined as follows:

- a. **Levels of Training.** Following the principle of progressive training stipulated in Chapter 1, the Army has divided training into seven levels, each with its own set of collective battle task standards (defined as suffixes A-G in the BTS manuals). Higher-level training is built on the success of lower-level training. At each level, training should be comprehensive enough to ensure a degree of mastery is attained before the next level of training commences. The levels are described in detail in the following section.

LEVEL	DESCRIPTION
7	Formation Level Training
6	Unit/Combined Arms Unit Training
5	Combined Arms Sub-unit (Combat Team)
4	Sub-unit (Coy, Sqn)*^
3	Sub-sub Unit (Troop/Platoon)
2	Section, Crew, and Detachment Battle Drills
1	Individual Skills/Battle Tasks

\*- Artillery will conduct Regimental Training during Level 4

^- Reserve Force Level 4 will culminate in Combined Arms sub-unit (e.g., Company Group). Regular Force Level 4 may include combined arms preliminary training (including CAX)

**Figure 2-6: Levels of Training**

- b. **Levels of Capability (LOC).** A LOC is a measurable level of competence in war fighting that reflects collective achievement and the maintenance of a specific set of QS and BTS. It is the minimum standard of performance deemed necessary to allow forces to progress to more advanced training or to be committed to operations. There are two distinct LOC in the Army, each reflecting the differences of standards that exist between Regular and the Reserve components of the Army. These LOC are listed below and explained in detail later.
- (1) Minimum LOC (MLOC): Regular Force core competencies based on all components of QS and BTS.
  - (2) Essential LOC (ELOC): Primary Reserve Force core competencies based on essential components of QS and BTS.

15. Within each LOC, operational readiness is measured by the level of training attained (e.g., MLOC 5 = combat team competency including all the appropriate QS and BTS gateway training).

- a. **Readiness States.** The LOC and levels of training are combined with other components of operational readiness (personnel strengths, equipment serviceability, etc.) to determine a unit's readiness state. There are three major readiness states:
- (1) **Reduced.** A unit with low personnel strengths (less than 90% of establishment) and low equipment holdings (less than 85% of entitlement)

requiring more than 180 days of preparation and training to deploy on overseas operations. Such units, however, must retain a capability to respond to domestic operations emergencies.

- (2) **Normal.** A unit with no less than 90 % of establishment strength and at least 85 % of equipment entitlement, requiring 30-180 days to deploy, dependent upon the LOC, level of training, personnel screenings and equipment serviceability requirements for deployment.
- (3) **High.** A unit with 100 % manning of establishment, 95 % holdings of equipment entitlement and requiring 30 days (or less) notice to move for deployment, dependent upon LOC and level of training achieved, personnel screenings and equipment serviceability requirements, and the need to complete TMST within the allotted notice to move (NTM) timing.

**NATO Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) Readiness States**

NATO Readiness States	R10	R9	R8	R7	R6	R5	R4	R3	R2	R1
NTM	365+	365-181	180-91	90-61	60-31	30-21	20-11	10-6	5-3	2-1

**Canadian Readiness Model**

Canadian Readiness States	Reduced		Normal		High			
	365+	365-181	180-91	90-31	30-21	20-11	10-3	2-1
DPG Unit/Fmn Tasks			MCF-OP SABRE		Vanguard BG		NEO	
					IRF(L)-OP GAUNTLET			
					SHiR Brig-OP VIKING			
					UNSAAS			
Level of Readiness	<85% UQL & <75% Eqpt Serv Trg: MLOC 1-3 ELOC 1-4		<92% UQL & <85% Eqpt Serv Trg: MLOC 1-7 ELOC 1-4		100% UQL & >95% Eqpt Serv Trg: MLOC 1-7 & TMST			

**Legend**

**NTM** - Notice of move timings (days)  
**DPG** - Defence Planning Guidance  
**MLOC** - Minimum Level of Capability  
**ELOC** - Essential Level of Capability  
**R** - Readiness State  
**NEO** - Non-combattant evacuation

**MCF-Op SABRE** - Main Contingency Force Bde Gp  
**IRF(L)-Op GAUNTLET** - Immediate Reaction Force (Land) Bn Gp  
**SHiR Brig-Op VIKING** - Standby High Readiness BG  
**UNSAAS** - UN Standby Arrangement BG and Bn Gp

**UQL** - Unit Qualification List  
**Eqpt Serv** - Unit Equipment Serviceable within NTM as per Op Readiness Report  
**TMST** - Theatre and Mission Specific Training  
 > - Greater than  
 < - Lesser than

**Figure 2-7: Readiness States, Levels of Capabilities and Training, and Operational Tasks**

16. Units in the Support/Reconstitution Phase of the force generation cycle may be put at a reduced readiness state; those in the Training Phase should be at a normal readiness state; and those in the Operations Phase will be held at high readiness. The breakdown of readiness states into LOC and levels of training allows for considerable flexibility in the management of units in the force generation

cycle, making task-tailoring options possible and presenting commanders a means to measure how best to move units from one readiness state to another efficiently and economically.

## SECTION 4 ARMY TRAINING AND OPERATIONAL READINESS

17. The Army uses LOC and training levels, in conjunction with operational readiness states, to accurately identify the readiness status of particular units. The difference between reduced and normal states of readiness is not specifically the level of training achieved, but the degree to which lower UQLs and equipment holdings restrict attainment of higher level training. Training differences within the various LOC must be further explained by presenting more detailed definitions of LOC and levels of training. It is also important to understand that each readiness state consists of training events that are categorized as individual, collective or continuation.

### LEVELS OF CAPABILITY

18. The LOC presented in Figures 2-8 and 2-10 are multi-functional and are explained below:

- a. **Minimum LOC (MLOC).** A minimum level of competency that reflects the professional skill/knowledge and experience needed by forces before they can progress to a more advanced readiness state or before commitment to operations. MLOC is measured by using the Levels of Training 1-7. MLOC comprises the QS and BTS that must be maintained if the Regular Force is to sustain its combat-capable characteristics. MLOC comprises the standards required to generate combat-capable forces for operational commitments up to and including the MCF SABRE Brigade. It reflects the professional standards of the Regular Force, which, because it is constrained in size, must demand a greater range of skills (cross training and redundancy in qualifications) from its soldiers in order to operate across the spectrum of conflict. Levels of training and unit manning levels for MLOC will be designated in the SORD. Main effort units will be allocated sufficient resources to achieve level 5, 6 or 7, and their personnel will be protected from taskings. Training will be progressive through levels 1 to 6 or 7, confirming selected BTS at each level before training at the next level. Continuation training will prevent skill fade of the skills and knowledge achieved in each level. Upon being confirmed as competent at one level of training under MLOC, that tactical group is considered combat capable at the confirmed level (e.g., MLOC 4) and is ready to progress to higher level training or is ready to undergo TMST before being declared operationally ready for deployment at that level. As indicated in Figure 2-9, the difference between reduced and normal MLOC is outlined as follows:
  - (1) to achieve MLOC to a normal readiness state, more than 90% of the individual skills required by the unit establishment, including operational redundancies, must be present for training;

- (2) all individual must have completed IBTS;
  - (3) unit equipment holdings and serviceability must be greater than 85%.
- b. **Essential LOC (ELOC).** A minimum level of competency that reflects the skill/knowledge required of the Reserve Force on Class A service and that allows for both augmentation or expansion. It is measured by using the essential components of QS and BTS (Levels of Training 1-4). QS and BTS have been subdivided into essential, supplemental and residual components (described in Chapter 6). The essential components are those tasks and knowledge applicable to the reservist on Class A.<sup>2</sup> The Reserve Force must train the essential component and be ready to train the supplemental component if required. The essential components of QS and BTS ensure that Reserve individual, collective and continuation training provide a core competency, resident in Reserve units, that enables force generation (including supplemental training) to meet Mobilization Stages 1 and 2. These stages include individual and sub-sub unit augmentation of the Regular Force for Stage 1 (Force Generation) and up to sub unit augmentation to sustain Op SABRE commitments in Stage 2 (Force Enhancement). Normally, Reserve units will be at reduced or normal readiness states, conducting ELOC individual training and collective training in order to remain ready to fulfil Stage 1 and 2 requirements. When Reserve Force soldiers are selected to augment Regular Force units for operations, there will be a requirement to address the difference in training standards (the supplemental components) by designing and conducting additional training for augmentees. This “delta” training may occur in a designated area training centre (ATC) or within the receiving unit. Some units of the Reserve Force will sustain higher readiness states for certain skill sets (e.g., nuclear, biological and chemical [NBC]; civil-military cooperation [CIMIC]; psychological operations [PSYOPS]), thus reducing their supplemental training requirement to that which is necessary to achieve commonality with the remainder of the deploying force.

## LEVELS OF TRAINING

19. The seven levels of training further refine the training aspect of operational readiness within each of the LOC. The levels of training are explained in detail below.

20. **Level 1** incorporates all individual QS training for skills and knowledge acquisition. It also includes individual battle task standards (IBTS)—the common denominator in training across all ranks and military occupations (MOCs) in the Army. These are the common standards of personal combat skills that must be achieved by all soldiers deploying to operations regardless of rank or MOC. Differences between the Canadian Forces, Army (Regular and Reserve) and MOC standards may require that additional training be conducted in a unit prior to deployment

---

<sup>2</sup> Depending on the specific QS or BTS, this portion will be approximately 40-60% of the total tasks and knowledge requirement of the QS and BTS as determined in the QS and BTS Writing Boards.

to ensure that all deploying personnel reach a common operational standard. The knowledge that all personnel deployed on an operation possess competency in basic military tasks is the foundation of collective trust amongst the members of the force deployed.

21. **Level 2** addresses the formation of small teams that can execute tasks to a very high standard. It uses the BTS letter B suffixes (from the BTS manuals) as training standards. Teams perform many vital functions, including patrolling, the operation of sensor systems that find the enemy, and the weapons platforms that engage and defeat them. Therefore, they are critical to the combat effectiveness of an entire unit. It is vital that the time and resources required to achieve the prescribed standards are assigned to the team leaders in Level 2 training. The resulting teams must remain intact for the duration of the operation for which they were trained. Team cohesion is at the core of a unit's combat power; dispersing the individual members directly diminishes that power. Once formed, teams must maintain their skills at the prescribed intervals to prevent skill decay, even as the unit progresses to higher levels of training.

22. At **Level 3**, teams are aggregated into sub-sub units, creating greater command and control challenges than at Levels 1 and 2. Level 3 uses BTS suffix C as standards. Tactical situations are less predictable and battle drills less detailed. From this level onward, battlefield complexities increase and effective command at one level is essential before higher level training can occur. The collective competencies will develop on top of those attained at the previous level. These competencies are framed in the BTS, which prescribe the conditions and expected outcomes for the performance of each battle task. Training at Level 3 is characterized by the frequent use of battle stands (see Chapter 5) within the sub-unit context.

23. The intent of **Level 4** training is similar to level three, using battle stands to isolate and practise arms specific tasks in each operation of war. Level 4 uses suffix D standards from the BTS manuals, but training may be conducted in the combined arms context in preparation for training as part of the combined arms team in Level 5. Armour and infantry conducting low-level tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) training is also included. It is important for the field artillery that regimental training occurs during a time when manoeuvre units are doing Level 4 (or lower) to ensure the readiness of forward observation officer (FOO) parties, batteries and the fire support coordination centre (FSCC) to respond properly during Level 5 training. It is also important to specify the unique requirements of the Reserve Force at Level 4. It is the upper level of competency for collective training in the Reserves, beyond which resource constraints are normally prohibitive. Therefore, as much as possible, Reserve Level 4 training should be conducted in the combined arms context, as company group training (or armoured reconnaissance squadron training), providing opportunity to train in combined arms tactics.

24. **Level 5** training is not simply troop/platoon TTP training: it involves a full strength combat team, completely manned and equipped, conducting combat team manoeuvre; it requires an ammunition package and resource envelope allocated in the SORD; and it should culminate in the combat team live fire training within a battle group (BG) context and, if possible, force-on-force confirmation using weapons effect simulators (WES). Level 5 training uses BTS suffix E standards. Continued commitment to the standardized TTP/SOPs trained during Levels 1-4 should ensure a constant improvement of performance through each new level. With successive repetition, lower-level BTS will become easier and quicker to accomplish, thus increasing the unit's overall ability to fight at a higher tempo of operations.

25. To accommodate unit training that must be perfected outside of the all arms team context, **Level 6** comprises both the BTS suffix F that govern these types of operations and the BTS pertaining to the BG (also detailed under suffix F). Unit training conducted in non-manoeuvre units prior to combined arms training should take place to ensure that the requisite common skills, knowledge and attitudes are present before subordinates are integrated into the more complex all arms environment. Level 6 training in staff and command procedures should be conducted with computer simulation. While Reserve Force units will not practise Level 5 and 6 field manoeuvre training, there should be opportunity provided for Reserve Command and Staff training at Level 6. Level 6 training culminates in a BG field training exercise (FTX), which includes force-on-force WES training events. Level 6 field training will be directed in the SORD, and units will receive an ammunition package and a resource envelop to effect such training. Training in Level 7 is also focused on combined arms skills. Both Levels 6 and 7 represent the LOC required for employment in combat operations.

26. **Level 7** training (using BTS suffix G in the BTS manuals) will extend to include training at higher formation levels, to ensure continued Army competency in brigade group operations, including deep operations and operations in complex joint and combined endeavours, and cognition of command and staff skills at echelons above brigade.

LEVEL OF TRAINING	LEVELS OF CAPABILITY	
	MLOC	ELOC
<b>Level 7</b> (Bde)	-Bde Comd and Staff Procedures (Letter G Series) -Formation Tactics	
<b>Level 6</b> (BG and unit)	-Unit Comd and Staff Procedures -BG BTS (Letter F Series)	-Unit Comd and Staff Procedures (BTS 1002 Letter F Series)
<b>Level 5</b> (Cbt Team)	-Cbt Team TTP and BTS (Letter E Series)	
<b>Level 4</b> (Sub-unit)	-Company/ Squadron/Battery TTP and BTS (Letter D Series) -Arty Regt Trg BTS (Letter D-F Series)	-Company/Squadron/Battery TTP and BTS (Reserve Letter D Series) -In a Company/Squadron Group Context
<b>Level 3</b> (Tp/Pl)	-Troop/Platoon TTP and BTS (Letter C Series)	-Troop/Platoon BTS (Reserve Letter C Series)
<b>Level 2</b> (Sect/Det/Crew)	-Team/Crew/Det/Sect Weapons and Tactics and BTS (Letter B Series)	-Team/Crew/Det/Sect Weapons and Tactics and BTS (Reserve Letter B Series)
<b>Level 1</b> (Indiv)	-Indiv QS Trg -IBTS	-Indiv QS Trg (Res) -IBTS (Reserve) And "Delta" Trg

Figure 2-8: LOC and Level of Training Relationships

State of Readiness	Component	Level of Capability	Levels of Training	Unit Personnel Strength	Unit Equipment Status	Notice to Move Timing
<b>Reduced</b>	Regular	MLOC	1-4	< 90%	<85%	>180 Days
	Primary reserve	ELOC	1-4 Reserve	<90%	<85%	>180 Days
<b>Normal</b>	Regular	MLOC	2-7	>90%	>85%	30-180 Days
	Primary reserve	ELOC	1-4 Reserve	>90%	>85%	90-180 Days
<b>High</b>	Regular and Special Force	MLOC	As assigned levels 4-7	100%	>95%	30 Days or Less

**Figure 2-9: Relationships Between Readiness Measurements**

27. TMST, including domestic operations training, may be included in any of the seven levels and directed in the SORD or in subsequent training directives. Training of Land Force Area (LFA) Headquarters as joint task force headquarters for domestic operations should occur annually. As this is a joint training activity, it is not formally included in the seven levels, but may well be a Level 7 event. Training guidelines and resources for domestic operations should be planned between the respective LFA HQs and Directorate Land Force Readiness (DLFR) and included in the SORD.

## SECTION 5 CONCLUSION

28. All Army training is conducted progressively through the levels of training to produce the assigned LOC. The LOC/level of training measurements facilitate more detailed analysis of unit readiness states, including units of the Reserve Force or mobilized forces. In this manner the Army will hold a portion of its force as operationally ready (or deployed), a portion of its force training to become operationally ready (training to MLOC 5/6/7) and a portion supporting training and conducting lower-level training (MLOC/ELOC Level 1-4). Figure 2-10 illustrates the relationship between LOC in greater detail, and Annex A provides Army application of the managed readiness concept.




Figure 2-10: The Levels of Capability / Levels of Training and Operational Readiness

29. Army training is designed to meet the operational readiness requirements of the Army and to ensure that the Army maintains a credible degree of professional competency across the full spectrum of conflict. Canada's Army understands the importance of maintaining a combat capability. War fighting skills remain the foundation of our individual and collective training systems (QS and BTS) and help to ensure that the Army retains its proper focus to meet the requirements of the future conflict environment.

30. The application of this war fighting focus in a systematic manner, while at the same time meeting operational readiness requirements, is a great challenge. The use of a Readiness Model with specified Levels of Capability associated with force generation phases creates a manageable systems approach. Defining training in terms of levels and stages helps to focus individual and collective training efforts.

31. There is a critical link between training and operations, and there is a need for a systems approach to ensure that the link is kept direct and relevant. Understanding this, the following chapters will be dedicated to presenting detailed information on how the Army's training systems strengthen the training-operations link. Specifically Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 introduce the Army's Professional Development model, the individual and collective training systems and the Reserve training model. These chapters describe how these systems provide Canada with combat capable, multi-purpose forces whose knowledge and skill in general war fighting is as reliable as their ability in humanitarian operations.

## ANNEX A ARMY TRAINING AND OPERATIONS FRAMEWORK

1. The Force Generation Cycle is depicted in the figure below. This cycle ensures that support is provided to the Army's individual and collective training systems; it takes an ordered approach to unit reconstitution, guarantees unit personnel stability during the Training Phase, and it maintains currency of skills during the Operations Phase.




Figure A-1: The Force Generation Cycle at Unit/Sub-unit Levels

2. Each of these phases can be of a different length, but all should be approximately one year. Applying the seven levels of training in the Training Phase results in an ordered progression to the required competency for the assigned mission. There is an orderly, focused progression of training, which leads to a unit or formation confirmation training event (eventually at the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre), at which point the unit is declared combat ready to a minimum level of capability (MLOC) standard. The Training Phase is followed by the Operations Phase, where the skills are employed. The inevitable skill fade is addressed through various training events, some programmed as Army collective training taskings and some mandated for specific mission readiness. During both the Training and Operations Phases, unit personnel should not be subject to individual tasks, and they should not be posted. In the Support/Reconstitution Phase, the unit enters a refit period where it upgrades equipment, changes command, sends candidates on career courses and responds to tasks. Where possible, support tasks should be grouped together and executed in a coordinated manner.

