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*The Army Lessons
Learned Centre*

DISPATCHES

**Manoeuvrist Approach
To Operations And
Mission Command**



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**MANOEUVRIST APPROACH TO OPERATIONS AND
MISSION COMMAND**

Commander 1st Canadian Division Foreward

Unity is essential to the effectiveness of an army. Perhaps most important in achieving that unity is a common understanding and application of doctrine, for if we are to fight together and win, we must have a common understanding of how. It is, therefore, incumbent on us all to read and understand our doctrine.

The Canadian Army is undergoing great change, a key component of which is the move to a new doctrine, based on a manoeuvrist approach to operations and mission command. Over the past year, several keystone doctrinal manuals have been published, by the Director of Army Doctrine, to articulate this new doctrine. As with all such changes, we face a challenge, not only to write and publish this doctrine, but in particular to get all within the army to read, understand and practice it.

This version of Dispatches integrates many of the ideas found in the new manuals and is intended to be one of the first steps, to get our new doctrine read and understood. This is not an attempt to summarize foundation doctrine published in the primary manuals. Indeed there is great danger in attempting to do so. This copy of Dispatches is intended to provide an introduction to the new doctrine. It is hoped that this will whet your appetite for more and that it will lead you to read and study the new doctrine in detail, if you have not done so already.

Doctrine is not only a unifying element, it is also critical to our effectiveness as an army. We must therefore make it applicable to our army and its operations. This means doctrine must be a dynamic and living thing. I urge you to make it so by reading, understanding and debating the concepts and approaches described here and in our manuals. Only when we are debating, in unit lines, messes, or on the armoury floor will we have a living doctrine. I also encourage you, having examined the doctrine critically, to provide the Directorate of Army Doctrine feedback in the form of identification of flaws or suggestions for improvement. Together we must refine the doctrine that will ensure the unity and effectiveness of the Canadian army into the 21st Century.



M.K. Jeffery
MGen

MANOEUVRIST APPROACH TO OPERATIONS AND MISSION COMMAND

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PART ONE - INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this edition of Dispatches is to familiarize soldiers at all levels with the doctrine that covers the **manoeuvrist approach to operations** (also known as manoeuvre warfare) and the command philosophy that best suits it: **Mission Command**. These two doctrinal issues are so closely tied together that one is insignificant without the other. This edition is not meant to supplant the doctrinal manuals (B-GL-300-001/FP-000 *Conduct of Land Operations (Operational Doctrine)*, B-GL-300-002/FP-000 *Land Force Tactical Doctrine*, and B-GL-300-003/FP-000 *Command*). These manuals describe, in detail, the intricacies of the manoeuvrist approach to operations and Mission Command. Read this edition of Dispatches with the aim to further develop our communal understanding of these topics. To assist, a baseline of common assumptions or principles must be asserted at the offset.

First, war is a complex venture that involves activities in both the physical and moral planes. For such a complex venture, the term "manoeuvrist approach to operations", although synonymous with manoeuvre warfare, is used to convey this concept more clearly. It highlights a "way of thinking (an approach)" which can be applied at all levels of command, instead of conveying the impression of an approach to operations based uniquely on mobility, which is often associated with the term "manoeuvre warfare". Our second common principle is: "these doctrinal issues are applicable at every level of command." The final principle is that the manoeuvrist approach to operations and Mission Command, as well as their fundamentals, are intimately intertwined. The reader, while going through this edition of Dispatches, is led to see how everything is interrelated.



The logical flow between Parts highlights these principles while emphasizing that war is a human activity involved in assessing a situation, deriving a plan and executing that plan. The reader is cautioned that even though this article presents several simplistic models, it is the integration of these models that is important. Therefore, Part Two identifies certain basic definitions pertinent to the subjects at hand. Part Three sets the scene. It highlights the context from which we derived our approach to operations and our philosophy of command. Part Four presents a simplified view of combat power and integrates its application into the manoeuvrist approach to operations. The fundamentals of Mission Command and the relationship with the manoeuvrist approach to operations are discussed in Part Five. Part Six is concerned with the adoption of the new command relationships. Understanding this rather mechanical Part is critical to properly seal the relationship between these two topics. We must be able to task, organize and field a force that supports a manoeuvrist approach to operations, and within which we can effectively command. Finally, Part Seven is a "quick and dirty" summary of many commonly asked questions regarding these topics. It may be helpful to read Part Seven at the outset.

PART TWO - DEFINITIONS

- ❖ **Centre of Gravity.** The source of the enemy's freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. That aspect of the enemy's overall capacity which, if attacked and eliminated, will lead to inevitable defeat or a wish to sue for peace through negotiations.
- ❖ **Combat Function.** Commanders seek to integrate the six combat functions and to produce overwhelming combat power against the enemy where and when it is most beneficial:
 - ◆ **Command.** Command is the execution of military authority by a designated commander for the planning, direction, co-ordination and control of military forces.
 - ◆ **Information Operations.** Information operations integrate all aspects of information (such as intelligence, communications and information systems (CIS), public affairs, civil affairs, etc) to support and enhance the other combat functions, with the goal of dominating the enemy at the right time, the right place with the right weapons and resources.
 - ◆ **Manoeuvre.** Manoeuvre is primarily the employment of forces through movement in combination with speed, firepower, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy to achieve the mission. However, manoeuvre may also involve other psychological components, such as deception.
 - ◆ **Firepower.** It encompasses the collective and co-ordinated use of target acquisition data from all sources, direct and indirect fire weapons, armed aircraft of all types, and other lethal and non-lethal means against air, ground and sea targets. Firepower, integrated with manoeuvre or independent of it, is used to destroy, neutralize, suppress and demoralize the enemy.
 - ◆ **Sustainment.** Sustainment is achieved through the balance of military administration and civilian support through host nation support, other governmental departments and agencies, and civilian contractors.
 - ◆ **Protection.** Protection encompasses those measures a force takes to remain viable and functional by protecting itself from the effects of an enemy weapon system and natural occurrences.
- ❖ **Combat Power.** The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit or formation can apply against the opponent at a given time.
- ❖ **Commander's Intent.** A concise expression describing *why* a mission is being conducted and the desired end-state situation.



- ❖ **Command Relationships.** The following command relationships are taken from B-GL-300-003/FP-000 *Command*. They have been adopted by the Canadian Army and are consistent with NATO doctrine.
 - ♦ **OPERATIONAL COMMAND.** (OPCOM) The authority granted to a commander to assign missions and tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and to retain or delegate operational and/ or tactical control as may deemed necessary.
 - ♦ **OPERATIONAL CONTROL.** (OPCON) The authority granted to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned.
 - ♦ **TACTICAL COMMAND.** (TACOM) The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.
 - ♦ **TACTICAL CONTROL.** (TACON) The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvre necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

- ❖ **Concept of Operations.** A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander, usually describing the immediate subordinate level's general contribution, in order to accomplish the mission.

- ❖ **End-State (Desired).** The end-state is that state of affairs which needs to be achieved at the end of the campaign or operation to either terminate or resolve the conflict on favourable terms.

- ❖ **Main Effort.** A concentration of forces or means, in a particular area, where a commander seeks to bring about a decision.

- ❖ **Mission.** A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose.

- ❖ **Synchronization.** The arrangements of military actions in time, space and purpose to produce maximum combat power at a decisive place and time.

- ❖ **Tempo.** The rhythm or rate of activity in operations, relative to the enemy within tactical engagements and battles, and between major operations. It incorporates the capacity of the force to transition from one operational posture to another.

PART THREE - CONFLICT & DESIRED END STATE

Conflict and Operations

Relations between different peoples can range from a condition of **peace** to **conflict**. This is depicted in the background to Figure 1 below, and is called the **Spectrum of Conflict**. Peace is relatively easy to describe, as it is the condition where there is no violence or any threat of violence between peoples. Conflict, on the other hand, is more difficult to define because it exists when violence is manifested or threatened. In the extreme, conflict between two peoples is war. As military professionals, we have the responsibility to advise the Government of Canada on the proper use of military force throughout the Spectrum of Conflict.

The Army classifies its response to the Spectrum of Conflict as the **Continuum of Operations** (Figure 1). In times of peace, the Army takes part in activities in support of civil authorities, such as OP ASSISTANCE (Winnipeg flood) and OP RECUPERATION (Ice Storm 98). However, as the conditions of peace deteriorate, such as in the events surrounding the Oka Crisis, or in the former Yugoslavia, the Army may be required to intervene and provide a military response. Recent history has shown that the best way to train for all operations along the Continuum of Operations is to train for war. To this end, our chosen and practised approach to operations must be adaptive and pertinent to the results desired.

Conflict is a clash of irreconcilable wills, and the object of conflict is to impose one's will upon the enemy. Therefore, the enemy's *will to fight* is the object and focus of our approach to operations. If the enemy no longer possesses the will to fight, then the fight is over. Shattering the enemy's **cohesion** and **will** to fight is paramount, and the approach that best supports this is called the **manoeuvrist approach to operations**, acknowledging the interrelationship and importance of the physical and moral components of war.



Figure 1 - The Continuum of Operations superimposed on the Spectrum of Conflict



Changing World and Future Trends

"War is the realm of **uncertainty**; three quarters of the factors on which action is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgement is called for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth..." Carl von Clausewitz, On War

In operations, a commander leads in conditions of risk, violence, fear and danger, making decisions in a climate of uncertainty. A commander should not only accept the inevitability of confusion and disorder, but also should try and generate it in the minds of his opponents. Therefore, commanders at all levels must consistently make sound decisions in an environment of uncertainty and constrained by time.

The Canadian Army, especially over the past decade, has found itself in conditions where the boundary between peace and conflict has been less than clear while the demand and necessity for accountability has been greater than ever (note the findings and recommendations of the Somalia Inquiry). Further, analysts have identified three trends that will affect future battlefields. The first trend seems to indicate the **increased lethality** and precision of weapons; the second, a **greater dispersion** of military components on the battlefield; and the third, a battlefield in which **information** of all types will be pervasive throughout (e.g. media, reconnaissance, satellite communications, etc).

Recent operational experience has supported these trends and has highlighted the importance of sound decision-making at the lowest levels. For example, the MCpl or Sgt section commander on patrol in Mogadishu or Belet Huen (Somalia), or the Pte on sentry duty in Bosnia, will make decisions and take actions that can potentially have an impact at the strategic level. In other words, our individual actions, because of many modern factors, such as media coverage, can potentially affect the integrity of the entire force and decision-making at the highest levels. Finally, close analysis of these trends may necessitate a renewed approach to training, emphasizing the requirement to practice initiative and sound decision-making by commanders at all levels, in uncertain environments and heavily constrained by time.



Desired End-State

The **purpose** of responding to a conflict or crisis situation, by means of providing a military force, is made clear by the highest levels of Government and transmitted to the military force by stating the desired **end-state** or conditions of success of the operation. The manoeuvrist approach to operations and Mission Command ensure this purpose is consistent throughout the force. At lower levels, commanders will ascertain their missions through their mission analysis, and transmit their intentions to their subordinates by stating their intent and concept of operations. By doing so, the desired end-state is transmitted throughout the force via the chain of command.

The desired end-state is the state of affairs which needs to be achieved to **terminate** or **resolve** the operation on *favourable* terms. In simple terms then, the manoeuvrist approach to operations answers the question: "**What** approach will the Army adopt to accomplish the end-state?" and Mission Command responds to the question: "**How** will commanders at all levels ensure that their instructions and intentions are conveyed to their subordinates?". The desired end-state guides all military action and provides guidance to commanders in the way they transmit their orders by providing a common intent for the military force.

Examples of Desired End-State

WWII	Unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers (Germany & allies)
Gulf War	Restore the sovereignty of Kuwait and reduce or negate the ability of Iraq to threaten its neighbours
OP Stablefoster democratic and self-reliance for the Haitian people.
OP SALON (Oka)the restoration of civil order.

PART FOUR - **MANOEUVRIST APPROACH TO OPERATIONS**

"The manoeuvrist approach is, to put it simply, a kick in the groin, a poke in the eye, a stab in the back. It is quick, violent, and for a moment, unfair..." Robert Leonhard, "The Art of Manoeuvre" (1991)

Combat Functions and Combat Power

The art of war is a complicated venture. Military forces are often large and unwieldy; the dynamics between commanders is often complex and convoluted; and subordinate actions are, at times, at cross-purpose from the commander's intent. In order to simplify this complexity and reduce the uncertainty of operations, theorists develop models that emulate the basic components of a military force to gain a better, coherent understanding of its dynamics. One such model is the model of **combat power** and **combat functions**. The combat functions are as follows (as defined in Part Two):

- ❖ **Command.**
- ❖ **Information Operations.**
- ❖ **Sustainment.**
- ❖ **Firepower.**
- ❖ **Manoeuvre.**
- ❖ **Protection.**




Figure 2. Integration of Combat Functions

Simply put, combat power is generated by the integration of the combat functions as depicted in Figure 2. The manoeuvrist application of combat power will be discussed later. The combat power model can be used to describe the components and activities of every level of command: a division, a brigade, a battalion, a platoon, or a section. At the lower levels, certain combat functions may be very sparse, but they are always present. Depending on the mission,

greater emphasis may be given to a particular combat function. However, it is the dynamics between all of the parts (combat functions) that make the whole (combat power) greater than the sum of its components. The table below compares the combat functions of a platoon and a brigade group (list is not exhaustive).

Combat Function	Platoon	Brigade Group
Command	PI Comd & PI WO	Bde Comd, Unit COs , Bde HQ
Information Operations	Patrols, Snipers, soldier media interviews, signaller, radios, GPS, Command Control Information Systems	Bde HQ, EWLO, EW Tp, HQ & Sigs Sqn, Recce Sqn, Recce/Int elms in units, public affairs, CIMIC, Int PI, UAV
Sustainment	PI WO on resupply	Svc Bn, unit QM, engr sustainment
Manoeuvre	AVGP, LAVs, APC (M113), LUVW, MLVW, LOSV	Armd Regt, Avn Sqn, Inf Bns, Recce Sqn, Feinting action
Firepower	Personal weapons, M72, 40 mm (GL), C-6, C-9, 25 mm chain or 50 cal MG	Arty Regt, Mor Pls, A Armour Sqn or pls, and all direct fire wpns
Protection	APC (M113), NBC equipment, camouflage	Engr Regt, all armour vehs, Bde HQ and unit HQs, AD Bty, NBC Recce, MP PI

Note: Every military force, regardless of its size can be expressed in terms of combat functions.

Manoeuvrist Approach to Operations

The manoeuvrist approach to operations is one in which shattering the enemy's cohesion and will to fight is paramount.

The above statement best summarizes the ultimate **aim** of the manoeuvrist approach to operations. This section will examine the concepts and fundamentals necessary to accomplish this aim, i.e. "**what**" is meant by the manoeuvrist approach. After this, the groundwork will be laid to better explain, in the next section, i.e. "**how**" it is applied within a military force.

Our adoption of the manoeuvrist approach to operations is based on the Principles of War and our understanding of the nature of conflict, i.e. that it is a clash of wills and that all activities of war take place in the physical and moral planes. Therefore, we acknowledge that victory can result by shattering the enemy's cohesion (physical and moral) and will to fight. The Principles of War encompass the lessons learned in past wars and operations, and guide commanders in the application of combat power to achieve success. The Principles of War are not applied as a checklist, guaranteeing success, but as a guide

against which the commander can compare his plan. At times in order to take advantage of a given situation, a commander may decide to forego a given Principle of War, if the risk is worth taking.

The manoeuvrist approach to operations is a concept that concerns itself primarily with attacking the enemy's vulnerability or centre of gravity. By attacking the enemy's vulnerability or centre of gravity, the eventual shattering of his cohesion and will to fight will follow. Both, the enemy's vulnerability and the friendly forces' attack may be physical or psychological. For example, in the Gulf War 1991, Iraq's Republican Guard was deemed Iraq's vulnerability, even though the Guard represented a significant military force. By attacking and defeating the Republican Guard, the Coalition Forces ensured that the remainder of Iraq's forces was ineffective and quickly crumbled.

Some descriptions of manoeuvre warfare emphasize how different it is from "attrition warfare", which aims to defeat the enemy by trials of strength on strength or frontal assaults. It must be clear that the manoeuvrist approach to operations, as described above, may clearly demand an attrition-like approach at the lowest tactical levels, and that, at times, an enemy's vulnerability may only be defeated by means of overwhelming strength. However, some key differences do exist between the manoeuvrist approach and a pure attritionist approach to operations. These are highlighted in the following inter-related fundamentals.

- ❖ **Focus.** Focus on the enemy's vulnerability (physical and psychological) and not on the ground. Emphasis is on the defeat and disruption of the enemy rather than attempting to hold or take ground for its own sake.
- ❖ **Mission Type Orders.** "Tell them **what** to do, not **how** to do it!" The philosophy of Mission Command, the command philosophy adopted by the Army, will be explained later. Essentially, commanders are given the freedom of action to direct their operations as long as it is consistent with the intent of the commander two levels up, and the concept of operations of the commander one level up.
- ❖ **Agility - Acting quicker than the enemy can react.** The aim is to make timely decisions and create situations faster than the enemy can react.
- ❖ **Avoid Enemy Strength, Attack Weakness.** Move along paths of least resistance and least expectation looking for weaknesses or vulnerabilities (physically and psychologically).
- ❖ **Support Manoeuvre with Firepower.** Manoeuvre as a combat function must not be confused with the manoeuvrist approach or manoeuvre warfare. However, together, manoeuvre and firepower, when applied at a critical point can effectively disrupt, dislocate or pre-empt the enemy.
- ❖ **Focus of Main Effort.** The commander concentrates his forces or means in a particular area where he seeks to bring about a decision. The designation of a main effort provides the focus for all his orders, and is properly described in his intent and concept of operations. The main effort also permits the orchestration or synchronization of various parts of the military force; i.e. setting in motion the forces that will fix the enemy, so that the bulk of the forces can attack (strike) along the line of the main effort. The main effort attack is carried out after the conditions for the attack are set.

- ❖ **Exploit Tactical Opportunities.** The commander must possess, and give subordinates, sufficient freedom of action to take advantage of the tactical situation. Rigid control measures must be avoided in order to enhance operational tempo.
- ❖ **Act Boldly and Decisively.** Commanders at all levels must deal effectively and decisively within an uncertain environment. They must accept this unavoidable condition, while attempting to generate it in the minds of their opponents.
- ❖ **Avoid Set Rule and Patterns.** Commanders must be imaginative and capable of adapting to the unique circumstances of a given situation.
- ❖ **Command from a Position to Influence the Main Effort.**



Manoeuvrist Application of Combat Power

Instead of trying to upset the enemy's **equilibrium** with the attack, the manoeuvrist approach to operations seeks to upset the equilibrium before a real attack is, or can be, successfully launched.

Taken from Australian Defence Journal, No. 119, 1996, Major M.G. Krause

So far, we have developed the model of combat power and highlighted the aim and fundamental concepts of the manoeuvrist approach to operations, which is to attack the enemy's vulnerability, by avoiding trials of strength, in order to shatter the enemy's cohesion and will to fight. This section will then answer the question of "**how**" combat power is applied within the context of the manoeuvrist approach to operations.

Physical and Psychological Attacks

It must be clear that the manoeuvrist approach to operations is **not** a theory about movement, but is a theory of how a commander can impose his will on an opponent by doing the unexpected in the physical and moral planes. The physical attack is practically useless without an accompanying psychological one. The decisive attack moves along the **path of least resistance**, like water flowing between the heights of the rocks, but it also has more impact because it moves along the **path of least expectation**, or line of psychological surprise (Major Krause, Australian Defence Journal, No. 178 July 1996). Liddell Hart wrote: "Only when the two (paths) are combined is the strategy truly a (manoeuvrist) approach, calculated to dislocate the opponent's equilibrium." Therefore, although the primary move may be physical, the *effect* is the dislocation or shattering of moral cohesion and will to fight.



Fixing and Striking

The theorists who sought to defeat the enemy by avoiding unnecessary attrition, and the manoeuvrists who advocate the same approach today, all agree that there are two core functions required to achieve success on the battlefield: **fixing** and **striking**. Canadian doctrine refers to them as the two dynamic forces on the battlefield, as advocated by Sun Tzu over 3500 years ago and Sir Basil Liddell Hart in his *indirect approach* after WWI. Nonetheless, the realities of the information age firmly establish **finding** as a key supporting function to enable **fixing** and **striking**. In this way, by highlighting the significance of finding the enemy at all times, and knowing where friendly forces are, makes the other two functions easier to grasp. Therefore, finding the enemy is achieved through intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) systems and activities working in concert to assess current, and predict future, adversary capabilities and intentions. Some of these systems are the Divisional EW Squadron and Intelligence Company, or the UAV and TA capability in the Artillery Regiment. Much of these efforts are presently encompassed in the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). Future systems, such as the Situational Awareness System (SAS) and the Land Forces' Command System (LFCS) will assist in finding the enemy and ascertain our own situational awareness. In summary, there is a need to know where the enemy is and what the enemy is likely to do, in relation to our own forces, at all times.

The **fixing** and **striking** forces work together, and for the seasoned strategist, they are interchangeable. Sun Tzu referred to these two forces as the normal (orthodox) force and the extraordinary (unorthodox) force respectively. The aim of the normal force is to fix an enemy in place to allow the decisively intended move, or extraordinary force (main effort), to prosper.

Therefore, the intricacies of **fixing** are more complex. It involves both a mental and physical aspect, and is heavily dependent on deception. In other words, the enemy can be fixed by block or guard action, but can also be fixed once forces have been committed. Also, one can fix the enemy by out-manoeuving the enemy's position, or by deceiving the enemy into committing forces. This is very similar to the boxer or martial artist who feints in order to commit the opponent, and then strikes the opponent's vulnerability. **Striking**, therefore is the action of moving and hitting the enemy with the full potential of your force. In applying the fundamentals above, manoeuvre should be accompanied by firepower. The following example from the Gulf War explains these dynamic forces at work, and the notion of physical and psychological manoeuvring.



" The Iraqi reinforcement of Kuwait can be seen as a precipitate move in reaction to the threat, "or baited gambit", of the amphibious landings from the Gulf and against the most likely invasion route along the coast. The Marines and Coalition forces that attacked along the coast on the direct route to Kuwait City were the orthodox (or **fixing**) force. When they had pinned the Iraqis in Kuwait, the

VII and XVIII Corps of the Coalition (or **striking force**) took the line of least resistance and expectation, around the open flank west of Wadi al Batin. Once the Coalition had broken through, it upset the Iraqi plans to block its move by continually moving and by threatening the alternative objectives of Baghdad and Basra. The effect on the Iraqi Command was one of almost total paralysis."

Taken from Australian Defence Journal, No. 119, 1996, Major M.G. Krause

Finally, the following example will describe how fixing and striking may take place in a **Peace Support Operation** and how psychological and physical actions must complement each other.

The scene is a common one. A checkpoint has been set up along a route well travelled by one of the belligerent parties. The checkpoint location was tactically selected to provide the best possible venue to oversee its operation, but also to display to the belligerents our will to enforce the terms of the peace accord. The checkpoint primarily provides a **physical fix** of the



belligerent, although it's recognized that it also provides a psychological one by our display of resolve. Conversely, in these scenarios, the **striking force** is usually a **psychological** one and is carried out in terms of **negotiating** with the subject halted at the checkpoint. It is very clear throughout the operation of the checkpoint that a physical action can take place. Hence the psychological and physical are closely intertwined.

Approaches to Attack Enemy Cohesion and Will to Fight

The application of the manoeuvrist approach to operations often enables small groups and units to inflict disproportionate damage on larger opponents, by placing emphasis on speed, violence, initiative and surprise. Although there are many approaches to attacking an opponent's cohesion and will to fight, the following three are cited:

- ❖ **Pre-emption.** Attack first, i.e. catch the opponent off guard while still assessing the situation and making his plan.
- ❖ **Disruption.** Attack always, even on the defence. A bold aggressive spirit must be generated in your military force.
- ❖ **Dislocation.** Attack to force movement into a position to your advantage, conversely, when dislocated, the opponent no longer has the ability to bring strength to bear. This complements the above explanation about the use of fixing and striking forces. Mental dislocation may involve making the opponent's view of the situation no longer valid, through deception or other means.



Means to Integrate the Combat Functions

The aim is to convert the potential of the forces, resources and opportunities into actual capability, which is greater than the sum of its parts, and to bring this power to bear on the opponent at a specific time and space. In other words, the successful commander must be able to bring to bear onto the enemy all of the potential force while considering all aspects of the battle or operation. When a commander clearly sees all the factors affecting the battlefield, and grasps the intricacies and essence of the plan, this is called battlefield visualization, or as Napoleon called it: "*Coup d'oeil*".

The following three means are used by the commander to integrate the combat functions into applied combat power.

- ❖ **Main Effort.** The commander designates a main effort, and establishes the conditions before it is launched, as explained above in the use of the fixing and striking forces. The main effort is a concentration of forces or means, in a particular area, to bring about a decision, for example the left flank and attacks by the VII and XVIII Corps in the Gulf War.
- ❖ **Synchronization.** This is the arrangement in time, space and purpose to produce maximum combat power. Some strategists use the term orchestration to place more emphasis on the arrangement of events and activities in terms of common purpose, in order to give subordinate commanders more freedom of action.
- ❖ **Tempo.** The rhythm and rate of activity in operations. There is a mental and physical tempo that must be maintained. The former involves a maintenance of accurate and timely decision-making, and the latter involves continued pressure on the opponent.

Figure 3 below encapsulates all the ideas previously presented. It is clear that the arrow orients the full potential of a military force towards a desired end-state (aim), and that the combat functions are integrated by means of designating a main effort, synchronizing all activities and maintaining the pressure on the opponent (mentally and physically). Finally, the function of finding the enemy, which is needed at all times, is superimposed over the two dynamic forces of fixing and striking.




Figure 3. Manoeuvrist Application of Combat Power

PART FIVE - MISSION COMMAND

" To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence."

Sun Tzu



Mission Command and the Manoeuvrist Approach

Tell them **what** to do, let them get on with determining **how** best to do it, as long as it follows your intent and concept of operations.

Patton

Several of the fundamentals of the manoeuvrist approach presented in Part Four suggested a specific style of command. Mission Command is that style. It is based on three enduring tenets: the importance of understanding a superior commander's intent, a clear responsibility to fulfil that intent, and timely decision-making.

B-GL-300-003/FP-000 *Command* should be reviewed for a detailed description of all aspects of command. Central to the theme of command, and specifically Mission Command, is the importance of the military force commander's decision-making process or battle procedure. It must be clear, at the outset, that all activities are centred on, and must support, the commander's expression of the design for battle through the commander's intent and concept of operations. Additionally, all staff effort within a HQ is reliant on the commander and the commander's guidance.

Mission Command can be explained in two ways. The first by describing the dynamics between the five fundamentals of Mission Command, and second, by describing the dynamics that exist between subsequent levels of command during the transmission of instructions.

Fundamentals of Mission Command

- ❖ **Timely Decision-Making**
- ❖ **Decentralizing Authority**
- ❖ **Unity of Effort**
- ❖ **Mutual Understanding**
- ❖ **Trust**

Figure 4, below, encapsulates the essence of Mission Command by describing the dynamics that are present when the above fundamentals are applied. First, **decision-making** is set at the lowest possible level and exercised by commanders on the spot. By **decentralizing authority** a superior commander is free to think about issues of concern at the applicable level of command, and to provide subordinates with the ability to implement their own plans and to take **timely decisions**. This will increase the operational tempo and ensure that tactical opportunities are grasped.

As depicted in Figure 4, the fundamental of **unity of effort** provides the common focus for potentially divergent activities of subordinate commanders. Therefore, unity of effort counters the dynamics of decentralizing authority. Lastly, **trust** and **mutual understanding** is the glue that binds a military force together, and ensures that a superior commander can entrust resources, personnel and authority to subordinate commanders. Equally, subordinate commanders will trust that their superiors have their best interests at heart and that sufficient resources will be made available to accomplish their tasks.




Figure 4. Fundamentals of Mission Command

Passage of Mission Type Orders

Orders are given in a fashion that enables subordinates to understand the commander's intentions (*why the mission is being conducted and the desired end-state*); their mission or tasks (*the effect they must try and achieve*); the purpose or intent of their mission in the commander's concept of operations; and, their delegated freedom of action (*the constraints placed on them*) and the resources that will be made available to them. The following highlights the requirements in the first three paragraphs of the Operational Order:

- ❖ **SITUATION.**
 - ◆ The adversary, terrain and weather in the area of Operations (AO)
 - ◆ The mission and concept of operations one level up
 - ◆ The commander's intent two levels up

- ❖ **MISSION.**
 - ◆ Clear, concise statement of task and purpose
 - ◆ Multiple tasks must be linked by a common purpose

- ❖ **EXECUTION.**
 - ◆ Concept of operations is where you describe your intent, scheme of manoeuvre or general outline, and main effort
 - ◆ Subordinate mission or tasks

Figure 5 depicts how a military force can exercise unity of effort from top down by abiding by the commander's intent two levels up and the commander's concept of operations one level up.




Figure 5. Passage of Mission Type Orders

Examples of Mission Command in Peace Support Operations and OOTW

OP VAGABOND (UN Iran-Iraq MOG 1988)



Lieutenant troop commanders were responsible for their part of the operation, which was to provide a communications backbone throughout Iran-Iraq, consistent with the intentions of the Force Signal Officer and CO located over 500 km away in Baghdad and Teheran. Sergeant section commanders were located over 50 kms from their troop HQ.

OP RECUPERATION (Ice Storm 1998)



Junior officers were responsible for the safe and efficient conduct of operations, widely dispersed throughout eastern Ontario and southern Quebec, consistent with the intentions and concept of operations developed by the Land Staff and Joint Staff in Ottawa, and the area staffs in Quebec and Toronto.

PART SIX - COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

Manoeuvrist Approach to Operations and Dynamic Organizations

In applying the manoeuvrist approach to operations and Mission Command, there is a requirement to ensure that the command relationships that exist between military forces are flexible enough to adapt to the tactical and operational circumstances. The annexes to Chapter 4 of B-GL-300-003/FP-000 *Command* describe in detail the adoption of the NATO command relationships, and the artillery tactical tasks and administrative relationships. The Canadian Army adopted these relationships in order to enhance interoperability with our allies. The aim of this section is to amplify the explanations on the command relationships found in Annex A to Chapter 4 of B-GL-300-003/FP-000 *Command*. The following table provides a basis for comparing the previously used command relationships and those in the current B-GL-300-003/FP-000 *Command*.

B-GL-300-003/FP-000	Operational Command - OPCOM	Operational Control - OPCON	Tactical Command - TACOM	Tactical Control - TACON
Previous Relationships	Under Command	In support ...		In location

The following sections provide a straightforward methodology to determine the proper command relationship. Although this methodology may address most situations, a commander is always free to amplify any possible ambiguity. This summary does not supplant the requirement to refer to B-GL-300-003/FP-000 *Command*.

Step 1. Determine **if** you will permit a subordinate commander to break down the force and use it for other tasks. The only relationship that permits this is OPCOM.

Step 2. Determine **if** the relationship is between manoeuvre elements (infantry, armoured, and aviation) or between elements of the same combat support (signals, engineer, artillery or MP) or service support formation. If it is, then the relationship will likely be OPCOM or TACOM, dependent on the answer to Step 1. Further, the choice between OPCOM and TACOM is the degree of liberty given to the subordinate commander in assigning a mission to the assigned element. For instance, a company attached to another unit TACOM for the specific purpose of a bridge demolition guard **cannot** be used for another mission, but can be assigned additional tasks relating to his mission.

Step 3. Determine **if** the element is a support arm or a support service element being attached to a manoeuvre element. This relationship is usually OPCON or TACON, dependent on the degree of liberty given to the gaining commander as to assigning a mission or not. Usually these types of elements provide a capability to the military formation as a whole, i.e. the close support artillery regiment provides a service to the entire brigade and only attaches an element (e.g. the FSCC) to the manoeuvre unit that permits access to the entire capability.

For instance, in a brigade group scenario, the artillery regiment will assign an artillery tactical group, comprised of the battery commander (BC), a Fire Support Co-ordination Centre and Forward Observation Officers (FOOs), to the manoeuvre element under an OPCON relationship. Therefore the CO of the artillery regiment retains the ability to move the guns, but has given the manoeuvre unit CO the ability to assign missions to the BC. The artillery capability to the brigade group has not been diminished. Equally, a divisional commodity point or communications facility may be assigned a TACON relationship with the brigade group to indicate that it is in its area of operation. The gaining formation is responsible to co-ordinate local defence with the element assigned TACON.

Figure 6 depicts possible command relationships within a brigade group setting. The above steps cover most common situations. Obviously, commanders are free to clarify any ambiguities that may arise in a specific circumstance. In this example, number one Infantry Company is attached to number 2 Armour Unit either OPCOM or TACOM, because they are both manoeuvre elements. Number 3 CS Engineer Squadron is attached to number 2 Armour Unit in OPCON for a counter-mobility task or TACOM in the instance of a bridge demolition, i.e., for a specific mission. Finally, the Service Battalion is setting up a commodity or delivery point in number 2 Armour Unit's area, and the relationship is TACON.




Figure 6 - Possible Command Relationships

PART SEVEN - SUMMARY AND REFERENCES

The manoeuvrist approach to operations and Mission Command are often presented separately, however, they should not. Both "philosophies" are closely tied to each other. The following sequence of questions and answers address the highlights of both concepts, and demonstrate (in a simple form) how they are related:

❖ ***What is the aim of the manoeuvrist approach to operations?***

The aim is to shatter the enemy's cohesion (physical and moral) and will to fight.

❖ ***What has to be attacked in order to accomplish the aim?***

By avoiding enemy strengths and concentrating on vulnerabilities or centre of gravity (physical and psychological), in other words, concentrate on the enemy and not the ground.

❖ ***How is this accomplished? How do you attack enemy cohesion?***

It is accomplished by fixing and then striking the enemy with your combat power along the path of least resistance and path of least expectation (main effort). Enemy cohesion is attacked by pre-empting actions; by disrupting plans and activities; and by dislocating balance and equilibrium (physically and mentally). These actions are not linear, but may take place simultaneously.

❖ ***Within the manoeuvrist approach, how is combat power generated?***

Combat power is generated by designating a main effort, associated to the striking force; by synchronizing the combat functions in time, space and purpose; and by maintaining operational tempo.

❖ ***How are instructions passed throughout the chain of command to implement the manoeuvrist approach?***

By exercising a Mission Command philosophy. Within a military force, the five fundamentals of Mission Command (decentralizing authority, unity of effort, trust and mutual understanding, and timely decision-making) create a dynamic that encourages subordinate initiative as long as it is consistent with the commander's intent, concept of operations and main effort. Basically, it emphasizes telling subordinates what to do, and not how to do it.



References:

B-GL-300-000/FP-000 *The Army*
B-GL-300-001/FP-000 *Volume 1, Conduct of Land Operations ~ Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army*
B-GL-300-002/FP-000 *Volume 2, Land Force Tactical Doctrine*
B-GL-300-003/FP-000 *Command*

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