

DISPATCHES

VOL 1- CONVOY OPS

FOREWORD


COMMANDER'S INTENT - DISPATCHES

The last three years have seen the most active operational commitment of the Canadian Army since the Korean War. Regular and Reserve soldiers from every occupation and every corner of the country are experiencing the hazards and challenges of conflicts around the world as they strive to maintain peace and assist in humanitarian aid. It is essential that the valuable lessons that are being learned in-theatre are passed on as quickly as possible to all ranks who may follow.

In the Second World War, the Canadian Army was faced with the problem of preparing a citizen army for the rigors of war. One of the most effective means was by the use of a magazine called "Canadian Army Training Memorandum (CATM)". In this magazine, directed at soldiers in the battalions and regiments, real accounts of Canadians and Allies who had been in action were recounted with a view to teaching important lessons learned, and to offer advice on training soldiers preparing for their own time in action.

"DISPATCHES", a quarterly publication, will follow the pattern of the CATM to disseminate to soldiers in units and the leaders who train them the lessons learned on recent operations. The magazine will outline new tactics, techniques and procedures that are being tried with success in-theatre. Each issue will focus on a major theme. This first edition concentrates on convoy operations, one of the most common and often the most dangerous and challenging operations that Canadian soldiers are called upon to perform.

It has been proven time and again in both peace and war that the success of an Army rests largely on the quality and initiative of its junior leadership. The ideas and procedures outlined in "DISPATCHES" have come from soldiers in the field (Canadian and Allied) who have done the job on operations. I intend that the observations and recommendations contained in this magazine will generate discussion amongst all ranks and will assist commanders and staffs in preparing their soldiers for deployments.



My last word is to the soldiers in the field deployed on operations. I challenge you to continuously review your tactics and procedures. If you have a better idea, if there is a problem with equipment or policy, or if you have learned an important lesson, share it with the Army through your chain of command. Only in this way can we ensure that we don't repeat mistakes which may cost the lives of our comrades.

G.M. Reay
Lieutenant-General
Commander

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CONVOY OPERATIONS

PART ONE -- INTRODUCTION



"DISPATCHES" is a quarterly newsletter aimed at informing the Army community about observations, issues and lessons learned from recent operational and training experiences. This newsletter compliments a soon to be activated electronic bulletin board composed of Canadian and allied post operational reports (PORs) which are now being collected on a central data bank by a dedicated Army lessons learned staff. The bulletin board will be available on the AWAN in early November 1994.

"DISPATCHES" is thematic in nature and all of the observations, issues and lessons learned will come directly from PORs, lessons learned publications and post operational interviews. In other words, the content of this publication comes from soldiers' field experiences and their recommendations on ways to improve future operations and training at the individual and collective levels. Furthermore, this publication and the newly activated data bank/bulletin board will be tied directly to Canadian doctrine and will be specifically cross referenced to the 11 combat functions for recording and tracking purposes. This is also true of the new electronic report which will be validated on operations later this fall.



"DISPATCHES" 001 concentrates on convoy escort and related operations in support of operations other than war at the battle group level and below. It is a timely topic because every Canadian unit recently deployed on UN operations has conducted some form of convoy work. In fact, for a number of battle groups, humanitarian aid relief and convoy operations have been their raison d'etre. This issue will review convoy operations in a mid to high threat scenario.



DISPATCHES

CONVOY OPERATIONS

PART TWO -- DEFINITIONS

Undoubtedly, one of the first requirements is to clearly define what in fact constitutes a lesson learned. After a year of reviewing the Canadian system and those of our allies, the following definitions have been approved for use by the Chief of Staff.



OBSERVATION. An observation is simply recorded raw data that takes place during an operation or exercise. Observations come from many sources such as existing Canadian and allied PORs, UNMO's reports and command and staff observations;

ISSUE. An issue is a topic that develops from one or more observations or recurring observations. For example, when a battle group comments adversely on a piece of equipment that was previously reported by an earlier rotation - this then becomes an issue for the staff to resolve; and



LESSON LEARNED. A lesson learned is an issue that results in a change to Canadian doctrine, tactics, organization, equipment or SOPs. The changes will be staffed through the Land Force Development process for approval.

CONVOY OPS

PART THREE -- CONVOY ESCORT AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Over the last three years the Canadian Army has participated in United Nations (UN) operations in Africa, the far East and the Balkans. These operations have often centred around the delivery of humanitarian aid which has been primarily accomplished using the time honoured convoy system.

Escorting these convoys has been a major challenge for Canadian UN forces because, as we have learned, the threat spectrum and mission appears to be ever changing. Opposing government forces, regional militia, tribes, multinational forces, various aid agencies, geography and weather are but of the a few of the factors that may have to be taken into account in convoy planning by battle group and sub-unit headquarters. The collective experiences of several UN rotations have taught the Army there is a right way and a wrong way to conduct UN convoy operations. This article will focus on the right way.

AIM

The aim of this newsletter is to review lessons learned from recent UN convoy escort operations.

OBSERVATION:

On 11 July 1992, an RCR Sgt in command of two M-113's, was escorting a small convoy from the airport to the east of Sarajevo over the UNHCR main supply route (MSR) when the convoy came under accurate and sustained sniper fire. The convoy had been sniped at earlier in the day but the two crews could not identify the source fire and therefore did not return fire. This time they were able to spot the source of the fire and immediately returned fire using C-7's from the vehicles. The sniper also stopped firing immediately and the convoy was successfully completed. The unit did not receive any more fire from that part of the MSR for the rest of that unit's tour.

Post Operational Debriefing

THIS CONVOY COMMANDER KNEW HIS ROE COLD! AS A RESULT, HE ACCOMPLISHED HIS MISSION AS ORDERED!

OPERATIONS

DOCTRINE

While there are several national and international publications, CFPs 305 (2) and (4), The Reconnaissance Squadron/Troop in Battle have generally provided the most useful start point for the development of predeployment unit training and unit convoy field SOPs for both armour and mechanized infantry battle groups. The following key definitions have been validated on operations:

- a. Escort. An escort is the force detailed to accompany and protect a column of vehicles from being scattered, destroyed or captured. Its commander is the escort commander;
- b. Vehicle Column. This is the vehicle or groups of vehicles (packets) to be escorted. These vehicles could typically carry personnel, arms, ammunition, POL, supplies (humanitarian aid) or a VIP; and
- c. Convoy. This comprises the escort and the vehicle column organized for the purpose of control and orderly movement. The escort commander is normally appointed as convoy commander.



OBSERVATION:

The escort commander must always command the convoy. The issue of command has been validated over the last several missions, and if this command relationship is not clearly understood by the column commander (regardless of his nationality) then the convoy does not march.

Post Operational Debriefing

The following three tactical groupings for convoy operations were also validated:

- a. The Advance Group. This group is the leading element of the escort. It proves the safety of the route and attempts to warn of trouble before the arrival of the vehicle column. It might be required to reconnoitre detours and to establish pickets. Helicopter support to this group greatly increase its effectiveness, particularly in detecting ambushes;


OBSERVATION:

The use of helicopters was not possible in parts of the Balkans because of the unstable opposing forces. In Somalia, however, helicopter support to the advance group was consider essential to mission success.

Post Operational Debriefing


- b. The Close Protection Group. This group provides the immediate close protection of the vehicle column. The escort commander is located within this group.
- c. Reserve Group. This element provides a rearguard/reserve, medical and recovery resources of the convoy.
- d.

Armour Troop Escorting a Large Convoy



DISPATCHES 7

Convoy Size. PORs and interviews have confirmed a trend in the Balkans and Somalia towards two types of convoys; the small convoy of 10 vehicles or less and the large convoy of 30 vehicles or more.




Small Convoy: The small convoy is normally guarded by two sometimes three escort vehicles. They are the workhorse convoys, generally used by the UN for internal administration. These convoys are most effective when employed in a sector which does not cross confrontation lines and uses a well established MSR. While their utility is proven, there is a real problem with security because the small escort precludes the deployment of the critical advance and reserve groups. This, for example, means the escort commander will always have the vulnerable column vehicles waiting right behind him at check points while he conducts the mandatory negotiation with the belligerents. It also means the escort commander has little flexibility in dealing with hastily erected road blocks and ambushes.

Post Operational Debriefing

Large Convoy: This convoy is the main large scale humanitarian delivery organization. It is normally guarded by a platoon/group which may be reinforced depending on the tactical situation. It is critical that the three tactical groupings are deployed with this size convoy because of the requirement to cross confrontation lines normally several times. The escort must have the communications, firepower, mobility and protection required to deal with minor ambushes, rogue roadblocks and bandits that may be encountered along or near the MSR. Sacrificing any one of the tactical groupings means reducing the escort commanders flexibility to accomplish his mission.

Post Operational Debriefing



CONVOY ESCORT AND COMBAT FUNCTIONS

TACTICAL C²

The convoy escort function in support of UN operations is clearly the junior leader's challenge. Lieutenants, Warrant Officers, Sergeants and Master Corporals invariably decide the convoys success or failure. This is because of the nature of the conflict itself and the fact that the majority of convoy escort missions are conducted at the platoon troop level and below. Nevertheless there is a lot the battle group can do to support convoy missions.

Battle Group and Sub-Unit Responsibilities in support of convoy operations are numerous. The first requirement is to acknowledge that convoys are tactical missions requiring complete battle procedure from beginning to end. The threat alone justifies this. Unfortunately, a number of units initially approached this mission more as a task and issued task sheet schedules similar to those used by a dispatcher. This approach did not work. Using correct doctrine is the key to successful convoy operations. The battle group commander must also get to know the local protocols and military customs of the AOR. This includes meeting the local commanders, police and mayors. These relationships will be invaluable for the convoy planning process. Liaison between military police, UNCIVPOL, UNMOs, ECMM, UNHCR and the local police is also essential. This liaison will provide much of the battle group's information and has in many cases provided the first warnings of trouble brewing in the AOR.

U.S. Army Call No.93-8 Dec 93

8 September 1992: Two French soldiers were killed and five wounded when their convoy drove into an ambush between the airport and Sarajevo. An internal UN investigation said that the convoy had driven into an on going battle after confusion from conflicting orders.

Post Operational Debriefing

OBSERVATION:

In late February 1994, a sergeant from the 12 RBC was leading a small Scandinavian convoy through a destroyed village near Visoko. For ease of control he had mounted truck mirrors on the turret of his Cougar. Half way through the village he checked the convoy in his mirrors and found himself looking at a local who had somehow jumped onto the back deck of his moving vehicle and was attempting to cut off a jerry can of fuel with a knife. The convoy commander quickly dispatched the unwanted visitor without stopping, (or seriously injuring the thief) and completed his mission as ordered.

12 RBC Interim POR

OP CAVALIER - ROTO 2: In the first three months of this mission, the 12 RBC Battle Group carried out more than 600 patrols, escorted 90 humanitarian aid convoys which delivered 6000 tons of cargo and 100,000 litres of fuel.

The following battle group list of essential elements of information (EEI) for convoy planning has been validated on operations. This list should be used for planning before and after the issuing of the warning order:

- What is the specific convoy mission?
- What is the threat?
- What is the RV and convoy schedule?
- What route will the convoy use - what alternates?
- Where are the best hides along the route?
- How many confrontation lines must it cross?
- Is it a large or small convoy - how many vehicles?
- What is the cargo?
- Do you need to inspect it?
- What is the national origin of the column?
- What is the name and rank of the column commander? Have we worked with this country before?
- How is the convoy escort organized?
- What are the packet commanders responsibilities?
- Do the belligerents know the convoy schedule?
- Is documentation complete?
- Do the neighbouring UN contingents know the convoy schedule; how can they help?
- What is the convoy action at the drop off point?
- What is the sector, battle group and sub-unit counter ambush/mine plan in support of this convoy?
- What is the communications plan, including backup procedures?

Post Operational Debriefing

OBSERVATION:

When a convoy deploys on a mission it is essential that the battle group have a troop/platoon rapid reaction team standing by (5 minutes notice to move) in or near the base camp. The requirement for this reserve has been validated in Bosnia.

RECONNAISSANCE

In addition to providing the normal C² functions, the battle group must perform two other activities that are absolutely critical to successful convoy operations. The first requirement is to continually dominate and prove the sector MSR and its alternates in the battle group AOR. Ideally this means having reconnaissance on the routes during daylight hours and observation at night even when no convoy operations are taking place. It also means getting to know where all the opposing check points, roadblocks and minefields are, and who is manning or watching them. The reconnaissance party should always be looking for safe hide locations along the route and measuring the distances from base camp to critical choke points for battle group headquarters. Finally, getting to know the strengths of and exact routes to neighbouring contingent camps early in a rotation is a good long term investment for the battle group. The recce platoon, troop supported by an engineer recce party is ideally suited for this task.

Convoy communications have been a real challenge for units in both Somalia and the Balkans. While the venerable VHF RT 524 (nominal 40 km range without RRB) has been adequate for internal convoy communications, it was not designed for long range work which may be necessary for the convoy - battle group HQ link. Furthermore, as VHF FM communications are line of site, performance is very quickly degraded in the mountainous terrain typical of much of the Balkans. Initial stop gap solutions to long range convoy comms included traditional methods such as use of the RRB's and the portable AN/PRC 515 HF set, and less conventional means such as reliance on other communications networks, including the civilian UNHCR network. To better address the long range communications problems in the Balkans a quick-fix buy of the civilian pattern HF Codan radios was carried out (the purchase of which provides an additional lesson learned on the perils of non-ruggedized, non-supportable comms eqpt!).



Remember in the BALKANS all radio traffic is in clear voice!

OBSERVATION:

Since that time installation of the VIC 120 (AN/PRC 515 with power amplifier) and the whip tilt antenna adapter (facilitating skywave propagation) with CANBAT 2 in the Balkans has significantly improved long range communications. Recent UN experiences, particularly in Somalia, have identified the requirement for more light, long range communication systems. These systems should include man-portable HF sets as well as portable satellite terminals. Eight WMARSAT portable satellite terminals have been procured, primarily to support LFC battle group operations (although currently the majority have been seconded in support of the UN mission in Rwanda), and preliminary staff work has been conducted to procure an additional 10. As well, there will soon be a requirement to replace all AN/PRC 515 sets, as this will no longer be supportable beyond 97/98. This requirement is currently being addressed by D SIGS EM. In the mid term, tactical long range communications will be addressed by the TCCCS Iris project, which will include procurement of new vehicle mounted long range HF radios and some satellite terminals. The first major Iris fielding is scheduled for 97/98 in LFWA.

LIAISON OFFICERS (LO)

The second and perhaps the most important action taken by the battle group headquarters is the use of LOs both at sector headquarters, and directly in support of convoy operations. Commanding Officers from both the Balkans and Somalia have commented on their critical importance to mission success. Because of the international make up of these types of missions, competent LOs must be selected early in the mounting phase and given extensive training in negotiating skills specific to their mission area. The importance of LOs cannot be overstated. At the sector



headquarters, the battle group LO ensures the unit's interests are looked after and the commanding officer is not surprised. This LO is also responsible for ensuring the sector convoy schedule is passed to the battle group in a timely manner using proper battle procedure. When not at a headquarters, all unit LOs should be constantly on the road with a view to becoming thoroughly familiar with their AOR. This means knowing the names of the principal local commanders, the UNCIVPOL, other police agencies, etc. At the convoy level, the LO is often deployed with the advance group or perhaps separately from the convoy and is mainly concerned with clearing the follow on convoy(s) through the various check points and confrontation points. In high risk scenarios, the LO's best means of travel is in an armoured Land Rover or armoured car.

HOT WASH UPS AFTER EACH CONVOY MISSION ARE ESSENTIAL TO FUTURE PLANNING! THIS IS AN IMPORTANT G2 AND G3 FUNCTION!

CONVOY OPS

PART FOUR -- TACTICS

MANOEUVRE - CLOSE COMBAT FORCES



Threat. The threat to convoy operations was and remains significant in all Canadian operational areas. UN convoys are routinely attacked by belligerents - often the sole reason being boredom aided by alcohol and drugs. In Somalia and the Balkans the belligerent's C2 was often very weak at the sub unit level. Many regional commanders were little more than warlords and therefore had to be dealt with on a case by case basis. As a result, convoys were vulnerable to direct and indirect fire weapons, although most Canadian convoys were mainly harassed by sniping, mortar, medium machine gun fire and hasty mine fields. It is important to note that while not necessarily well trained manoeuvre troops, the local

belligerents are capable of determined defensive operations. And since their well developed defensive positions often sit astride the MSR, they actually pose a direct threat.

Platoon/Troop Level Convoy Escort. At this level the escort commander must have in place sound tactical drills for his mission. A detailed reconnaissance plan and map recce are essential. Chalk board all of the critical choke points, road blocks and action at confrontation points with your men after orders. Rehearsals are essential. Remember many convoys are composed of civilians from UNHCR and other aid agencies, and you are their only protection on the march.

Checkpoint Procedures. Checkpoints are an accepted part of life in the Balkans and they are erected by all communities in response to the perceived threat. They may be simple (one man with a stick across the road) or elaborate (bunker positions covered by mines and wire). So far it appears that most checkpoints can be crossed with only minor difficulty after some negotiation. However, checkpoints may be quickly established on the MSR with little warning in response to local conditions. The following procedure has been generally successful

OBSERVATION

10 Canadian soldiers have been killed and 33 injured in UN operations over the last three years.

OBSERVATION

In many cases local units will snipe around a convoy hoping to "spook" UN forces into unnecessarily returning fire and escalating the action at our expense. Nerves of steel are a basic requirement on these operations.

KNOW YOUR ROE!

- **REPORT "HELD UP CHECKPOINT"!** (especially if on a new route) This action by the advance group warns the escort commander and ensures that the close protection group will not bunch up on the checkpoint. Also this report alerts the battle group headquarters which always has a rapid deployment team standing by.
- **THINK.** Conduct your crew commanders appreciation. Has this checkpoint been previously identified as an aggressive check point? Have you seen these local belligerents before?
- **ACT.** Do you stop or not? This is perhaps the most important decision of the advance group commander. Frequently, if the barrier is up or the position is partially manned then the action of slowing the lead vehicle and the commander waving at the guard will suffice to allow passage through. If the checkpoint is also a strongpoint, then you will likely have to stop. Assess how you will approach negotiations. Based on their attitude, it may be pointless to negotiate - if so, think about how you will withdraw. However if negotiation appears to be a requirement for safe passage, dismount and commence negotiations. Once stopped you should:
 - Get the lead vehicle as close as possible to the barrier. Ensure the vehicle is "buttoned up", including the driver (this also means having all crew positions manned, including weapons)
 - The junior C/S should stand off and observe - perhaps 100 metres back of the barrier (also "buttoned up" except for the commander whose eyes are just above the hatch ring). His main job is to protect the advance group leader and the LO if they are attacked.
- **NEGOTIATE.** Once the fighting vehicles are in place, the advance guard commander may then dismount and begin negotiations unless an LO has been grouped in support. The following procedure works:
 - Identify who is in charge. This may often be frustrating and time consuming.
 - Find out why you have been halted. This may range from boredom at the checkpoint to the belligerents implementing a deliberate policy of harassment - usually a local initiative.
 - Quickly determine if they are looking for hostages (develop a hand signal for this with your security group).
 - Once you have identified who is in charge and why you have been stopped then negotiate accordingly. Learn by heart "Your commander has guaranteed freedom of movement by UNPROFOR, why have you stopped us?...".
 - Once through the checkpoint continue to assess the threat and determine how you can best come back to aid the escort commander.
- **INSPECTIONS.** All checkpoints have the right to inspect the cargo, especially at confrontation points. Ensure you as escort commander are satisfied that the cargo is humanitarian aid only. The black market trade is big business and if an aid truck is found aiding and abetting the 'other side', then you will be blamed and not the column commander. Your credibility is a major asset in negotiations, don't lose it early in a rotation because of someone else's actions. If in doubt, inspect the convoy before you march - that includes late arrivals at the RV.



CONSIDERATION FOR ACTION IN AN AMBUSH

- Respect ROE.
- Where is the fire coming from?
- Is the incoming fire effective?
- Can I positively identify where the fire is coming from?
- What are the consequences?
- What is my convoy composed of soft skin, POL, civilian or military?
- Can I zip through or do I have to fight my way through?
- Are there alternate routes?

Remember **You** must be prepared to react to any situation and you as commander on the spot are in the best position to make the right decision.

Post Operational Debriefing

THE LOCALS DON'T HAVE THE RIGHT TO LOOK IN YOUR FIGHTING VEHICLES, SO DON'T LET THEM!

Tactical Hints

- Use an advance guard where available but always with a large convoy
- Never use less than two vehicles in a team
- Employ helicopters with advance guard (If possible)
- Know the quickest route to other UN compounds and the best medical stations
- The farther forward the advance guard the better
- Know your route and terrain well. Develop your IAs for ambush from the front flanks and rear.
- Rehearse
- Ensure the column commander knows what you want his column to do in the event of contact,
- Always have a reserve in the convoy.
- Keep your headquarters regularly informed of the progress of the convoy.
- Know the plan for the battle group's stand by force.

Cdn POR and Post Operational Debriefing

CONVOY OPERATIONS ABOVE PLATOON/TROOP



There are times in UN convoy operations when the convoy must get through but the threat is too great for a platoon troop to operate safely on its own. In these situations, the deployment of combat teams and even the battle group itself may be required to provide the necessary security to push the aid to its objective. The tunnel concept, a British tactic for convoy protection above platoon level, has been successfully employed several times along 'hot' routes in Bosnia.

In essence, the concept employs the following three organizations usually working at the battle group (-) level:

- the security element
- the convoy(s), and
- the reserve

The security element or 'tunnel force' is the first group, which is often a mechanized company. This element moves first with the mission of physically dominating the route from the convoy start point to the release point. Once the tunnel is in place, the second force, a well defended convoy(s) commences movement. The tunnel force only engages indigenous forces if the convoy or themselves are engaged (critical choke points and checkpoints are actually under observation and can be engaged, if necessary by direct fire). The tunnel reserve is the third element and is normally waiting in a hide or base camp outside the tunnel. C2 is therefore a battle group responsibility. The following scenario is an example of the tunnel concept on route DIAMOND:

OBSERVATION



11 February 1994, 35 km from VISOKO: a combined Canadian/British tunnel operation was conducted to deliver humanitarian aid to two hospitals and recover a 5 ton truck that was lost in an ambush during a regular convoy mission, The same route, which earlier, was

impassable to convoy traffic, was noticeably quiet throughout the subsequent tunnel operation.

Post Operational Interview

TUNNEL CONCEPT

1. **Indigenous Forces.** It is assessed that all of the Check Points (CP) on route DIAMOND have been established for local protection of the various villages along the route. There is no identified direct threat to UNHCR convoys, although local fighting continues. As a result regular convoy operations from VITEZ to PROZOR have been caught in the middle of local fire fights and several UN vehicles have been destroyed

2. **Mission.** The Sector Commander wants DIAMOND open for convoy traffic and decides to launch a battle group (-) tunnel operation.

3. **Concept for TUNNEL.** There are four major CPs on route DIAMOND:

- TRAVNIK 'T' Junction
- CP2 NOVI TRAVNIK
- CP3 OPARA
- CP4 MAKJLEN

PHASE ONE. Company (-) will create tunnel from CP 1 to CP4 which will be manned by two armoured C/S each through out the operation, In addition to dominating the CPs these C/S will provide timely info on route congestion and provide local traffic control for the convoy(s). Two additional armoured vehicles will provide roving route security from CP 1 to the 78N while another pair conducts the same task from the 78N SOUTH to CP4.


PHASE TWO Once in place the tunnel commander will inform battle group headquarters which will in turn order the waiting convoy(s) in VITEZ to commence movement through the tunnel.

NOTE: The convoy(s) itself must still maintain its internal tactical groupings as discussed earlier.

NOTE: A coy/sqn reserve stands by in TRAVNIK on call.

NOTE: Dedicated battle group FAC/F00s and indirect support elements (mortars) are essential components of the tunnel force.

British Army OP GRAPPLE POR



COMBAT ENGINEER AND MINE WARFARE

The mine threat is very real in UN operations as there are literally hundreds of thousands scattered across the country side, both anti-pers and anti- tank. Remember mines account for the majority of casualties in Canadian units. The first requirement at battle group level is to absolutely ensure that mine awareness receives top priority during pre-deployment training. Continuing a mine awareness campaign in country is also a wise move - posters in messes, platoon houses and administration buildings are a must. Furthermore, in theatre mine awareness refresher training from the local engineers is critical to mission success. Having a healthy respect for mines and knowing their strengths and limitations means you will not be paralyzed by the fear of the threat. Remember, mines are a part of convoy life. Some other helpful hints about mine awareness:

- Vehicles should carry the following standard equipment:
 - Roll of mine tape
 - carry an extra radio antenna (they have a habit of getting blown off which makes it difficult to call for help)
 - each patrol or pair of fighting vehicles should carry an emergency "A" frame for emergency towing
 - each vehicle should carry a hand held mine prod
- Avoid:
 - Gravel and dirt roads that have not been cleared
 - Road shoulders and ditches
 - Abandoned buildings and equipment
 - Forest and untended fields
 - Going off road to drive around even simple roadblocks or obstacles.



OBSERVATION

28 January 1992 Somalia: The SSM's Bison APC struck a Belgian made PRB anti-tank mine on a corner of a track over which the bulk of the RCD squadron had passed less than an hour before. The right front wheel was blown off and only the suspension was damaged. It took the squadron several hours to extract the vehicle from the minefield using proper 'drills' None of the crew was injured.

Armour Bulletin Vol 27

ACTION DURING A MINE INCIDENT

- STOP, OBSERVE AND REPORT IMMEDIATELY
- DON'T RUSH IN TO HELP OR YOU TOO WILL BECOME A CASUALTY!
- IS THE MINEFIELD COVERED BY FIRE?
- BE PREPARED TO COVER YOUR INJURED MATE OR DAMAGED VEHICLE
- CALL FOR MEDEVAC (IF NECESSARY) AND COMBAT ENGINEERS
- ONCE THE AREA IS SECURE, COMMENCE CLEARING A LANE TO THE CASUALTY OR DISABLED VEHICLE
- THINK, THINK, ALWAYS THINK, MINES DON'T CARE WHO THEY KILL OR MAIM.

DON'T COLLECT SOUVENIRS! LEAVE THEM ALONE! THEY MAY EXPLODE AND KILL YOU!

CONVOY OPS

PART FIVE -- COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

MEDICAL

Next to patrols, convoys are probably the most exposed elements in UN operations. They are often 20 to 30 km or more away from their base of operations and often have to cross several confrontation points on a regular basis. Because of this factor and the threat, the need for comprehensive medical coverage cannot be overstated. Unfortunately, the nature and frequency of convoy operations often precludes the attachment of the traditional medical assistant (MA) with ambulance. This is because there are simply not enough to go around, even though the number of MAs to a battle group has been increased. As a result, small convoys and even some large ones have had to rely on themselves because battle groups have been generally reserved the deployment of ambulance APC teams for large convoys operating in high threat areas. Concurrent with this reality is the fact that the traditional "Dustoff" helicopter cannot be counted in some regions like Bosnia because of the time required by the various officials to get the necessary flight clearance (sometimes up to six hours). It is therefore often quicker for soldiers on the march to administer emergency combat first aid (FA) to a casualty and then transport him overland to the nearest UN compound with an advanced medical station.

Some battle group commanders have recognized this problem early and as a result have adopted the following extraordinary medical procedures:

- CONDUCT ADVANCED COMBAT FA THROUGHOUT THE UNIT INCLUDING A THOROUGH UNDERSTANDING OF APPROPRIATE MORPHINE USE;
- IN-THEATRE, EQUIP EACH FIGHTING VEHICLE OR PATROL WITH AN ADVANCED FIRST AID TRAUMA KIT; AND
- ENSURE EACH VEHICLE COMMANDER KNOWS THE EXACT LOCATION AND ROUTE TO THE NEAREST MEDICAL STATIONS IN THAT UNITS AOR, REGARDLESS OF NATIONALITY.

THE MA MUST NEVER CREW COMMAND HIS AMBULANCE - EVER!

The trauma kits have been placed in local 82mm mortar crates and painted white with the requisite cross (81 mm crates would also work). Each fighting vehicle should identify a crew member as the vehicle MA. He is then responsible for using and maintaining the trauma kits. Remember these FA kits are distributed because there is potential for mass casualties in isolated locations.

Refresher FA training is a must

When attached to a convoy, the MA with APC ambulance is best situated with the Reserve Group.

BATTLE GROUP TRAUMA KIT

Each trauma kit consists of the following as an absolute minimum:

10 x Shell Dressings	5 x Sterile 4x4s
5 x Triangular Bandages	5 x Sterile 2x2s
2 x Ringers Lactate 1000cc IV - 2 x IV sets	1 x Elastoplast Bandage 7.5 cm x 0.9 cm
4 x 18G Cathelons	1 x Elastoplast Bandage 3.8 cm x 0.9 cm
6 x Alcohol Swabs	1 x Dermicel Tape (1 inch)
6 x Betadine swabs	4 x Tagaderm Dressing (IV)
1 x Penrose Drain venous Constriction Band	1 x Combat FA review and IV Illustration
1 x Pair Universal Scissors	1 x Surgical Scissors
1 x Arm Splint	Morphine (MO decides quantity)
1 x Bottle of Savlon Cleaning Solution	



RECOVERY

During the march, one of the convoy commander's considerations is how he will recover broken down escort and column vehicles. The basic rule is you never leave a vehicle behind unprotected. The decision on how many escort and recovery assets remain behind lies solely with the escort commander and is based on the threat and the protection requirements for the remainder of the convoy. The battle group should help by placing vehicle recovery teams on standby in the base camps, guarded "if necessary" by the rapid deployment team. Don't forget the requirement for engineer back up in case of a mine recovery job. Preventative maintenance is also very important to mission success, particularly because fighting vehicles are weighed down by their full combat load.

COMBAT SUPPLIES

Convoy escorts must also always depart the base camp with a complete basic load. This is critical because of the frequent delays and prolonged halts at certain checkpoints.



CONVOY OPS

PART SIX --TRAINING

As stated earlier, the focus of all training for operations other than war, including convoy escort, must be at the lowest level of command. Demanding mission oriented training for junior officers and NCOs is the key to unit success. The following related subjects should be emphasized during convoy escort training:

- Negotiating (at the section/patrol level)
- ROE
- Mine awareness
- Combat FA (pick crew MA)
- HF radio training (515 and VIC 120)
- Convoy driving (rural and urban)
- Crack and thump training (mounted)

The core of convoy escort training should, however, centre around collective training using scenario driven exercises conducted by another unit in the brigade. The following scenarios are recommended:

Scenario One - 'Hot' Checkpoint. A small/large convoy is halted at a checkpoint when it comes under fire from a section (-).

Scenario Two - Ambush Front. A small/large convoy is ambushed from the front of the column by a sniper.

Scenario Three - Ambush Flanks. A small/large convoy is ambushed from a flank of the column by a medium machine gun in a bunker.

Scenario Four - Ambush Rear. A small/large convoy is ambushed from the rear by an anti-tank missile.

Scenario Five - Negotiations. A checkpoint manned by thugs gives the convoy a difficult time and attempts to "confiscate" part or all the convoy (repeat several times).

Scenario Six - Minefield. A small/large convoy runs into a hasty minefield. Several casualties result.

Scenario Seven - Riot. When passing through a built up area, the convoy is attacked by locals (including women) intention stopping the convoy and stealing the aid.

Scenario Eight - 'Guests'. An escort force meets a UNHCR convoy at an RV when a second aid agency attempts to join the convoy. The guests are carrying black market goods and weapons in addition to the aid cargo in their trucks.

Scenario Nine - Armoured Taxi. A platoon/troop is tasked to escort an opposing force commander across a

confrontation line. At the checkpoint, his enemies attempt to take him from the escort.

Scenario Ten - VIP. A platoon/troop is ambushed by sniper fire while escorting a UNHCR VIP.

Scenario Eleven - Hostage. At a checkpoint, the belligerents attempt to capture the advance group or convoy commander during negotiations.

RELATED OPERATIONS

- Escorting LOs to sensitive/dangerous zones.
- Armoured taxi service. Escorting opposing force VIPs to command meetings.
- VIP escort.
- UNMO/ECMM escort.
- Local trader escort. Usually associated with civic utilities such as electricity and water supply.
- PW/Body exchange escort

Collective/combined arms convoy training should culminate in a series of battle group (-) tunnel exercises (perhaps 36 hours). Convoy training should be linked to other battle group training activities and last no less than five to nine days depending on the unit mission.



OBSERVATION

SQFT has begun a policy whereby veteran sub units and staff are seconded to units warned off for operations. A veteran Operations or Training Officer can provide an great deal of mission specific advice which can be directly applied to the battle group training plan. Also, using the recent veterans as the core of the 'enemy force' for exercises has been very successful.

Post Operational Interviews


CONVOY OPS

PART SEVEN -- EQUIPMENT UPDATE [DLR]


"F VEHICLES"

- C5A1 coax machine gun will be replaced by the C6 GPMG commencing October 1994 (total buy 432 for both Cougar and LAV 25).
- Enhanced Armour Protection (EAP) for operational Cougars using Light Applique System Technique (LAST). Installation will commence August 1994.
- Depot Level Inspection has commenced for turret systems - Canadian based units completed July 1994 and operational units commencing September 1994.
- 300 co-ax C6 GPMGs will be delivered between January and February 1995 for the Grizzly.
- EAP for operational Grizzly using Light Applique System Technique (LAST). Installation will commence August 1994.
- Grizzly depot level inspection and repair programme is now complete.
- Flex model C6 GPMG will be delivered to infantry M-113s between March and December 1995.
- M-113s will be refurbished with an EAP package beginning August 1994. The German IBD package consists of frontal and side add-on plates, as well as belly plate and front sponson mine protection.
- Flex model CIS GPMG will be delivered to Bison and Husky MRT between March and December 1995.
- Both vehicles will be fitted with new TR 80 winches in the next two years. Husky winch internal, Bison external. Note: Bison will be able to tow from front and rear.


COUGAR




GRIZZLY




M-113



ÉMR DU BISON
ET DU HUSKY





PERSONAL EQUIPMENT

The Soldier's Helmet replacement project will go to tender fall 1994 with a planned delivery date commencing in 1996. Note: Interim use of the US Army PASGT helmet has been very successful on operations. Proven US features will be incorporated in new Canadian helmet.



Fielding of the new fragmentation vest began in 1991. Over 7000 vests have been issued with several new modifications. Improved prototypes are under continuous development. Note: This vest was designed to stop fragments and not bullets.



Approximately 400 special bullet proof vests have been distributed to units in the Balkans for issue to those soldiers exposed to direct threat from small arms fire. Approximately 450 load bearing vests (photo not avail) with plates are being procured for trial with CCUNPROFOR units this fall. This vest fits over the fragmentation vest to upgrade personal protection against small arms fire as well as significantly improving the soldier's load carrying capability.

The first deliveries of the modified in service combat vehicle crewsuits are now taking place. The new design incorporates an inherent flame retardant material backed up by heat barrier undergarments similar to those worn by 10 TAG air crews. The new crewsuits will replace existing crewsuits as they wear out. The US Army crewsuits remain the interim measure for operational units until the old crewsuits are out of the system.



CONVOY OPS

PART EIGHT -- DOCUMENTATION AND REFERENCES

CANADIAN

CFP 305(2) Recce Sqn in Battle
CFP 305(4) Recce Tp in Battle
Op Harmony ROTO 1 POR
Op Harmony ROTO 2 POR
Op Harmony ROTO 3 POR
Op Cavalier ROTO 1 POR
Op Cavalier ROTO 2 POR
Op Deliverance POR
Armour Bulletin Vol 27
Infantry Journal Number 26

ALLIES

US Army CALL Newsletter 93-8
Op Restore Hope POR (USA)
Op Grapple POR British Army
Op Solace POR Australian Army
Nordic UN Tactical Manual Vol 2
UNPROFOR Magazine Number 1